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Law and Digestion: A Brief History of an Unpalatable Idea
Dan Priel*
Abstract: According to a familiar adage the legal realists equated law with what the judge had for breakfast. As this is sometimes used to ridicule the realists, prominent defenders of legal realism have countered
that none of the realists ever entertained any such idea. In this short essay I show that this is inaccurate.
References to this idea are found in the work of Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, as well as in the works
of their contemporaries, both friends and foes. But I also show the idea is older than the legal realists.
One ﬁnds casual references to it in academic literature and newspapers from around that time, which
suggest that the phrase reﬂected something of a received, if cynical, wisdom. Although none of the realists
ever studied the question seriously, I further explain how it ﬁt within their views on law, as well as how
it might be tested today.

Now I really do see that judges and governors ought to be and need to be made
of bronze, so as not to be worn out by all the pestering from these folks who
come on business and expect you to be listening to them and dealing with them
at all hours of the day and night, and attending only to their affairs, come what
may….So, all you fools and idiots coming on business: don’t be in such a hurry,
wait until the proper time, don’t come when it’s time for me to be eating or
sleeping, because judges are made of ﬂesh and blood, and must give to nature
what nature naturally needs….1

I.
The English judge Charles Bowen once said that “the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as
the state of his digestion.”2 As a statement on either the mind or digestion, it is probably not very
controversial; the connection between the two, however, has proven more contentious. When
Judge Alex Kozinski wanted to make fun of the legal realists, he attributed to them the view that
law is what the judge had for breakfast.3 For him, this showed just how ridiculous some legal
scholars’ ideas could be, how unmoored from reality, perhaps even how irresponsible. But did
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1
MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 812 (Penguin, John Rutherford trans., 2000) (1615).
2
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch.D. 459, 483 (1885) (C.A. (Eng.)) (Bowen L.J.).
3
Alex Kozinski, What I Had for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
993, 993 (1993).
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any legal realist ever say this? In his sympathetic reconstruction of legal realism Brian Leiter
denied the charge.4 Frederick Schauer has also failed to identify any clear source for the idea,
suggesting instead that Jerome Frank only made this as an “offhand oral quip,” or even that he
was saddled by what was actually said “in jest” by other people.5 And yet the idea lives on, at
times as a harmless exaggeration of the legal realists and their ideas, at others as the object of
ridicule. Is there any truth to it, or is this just an urban legend?6
It should not surprise readers that the idea is more frequently found in the writings of the
realists’ critics. If there is one person responsible for the association of legal realism with judicial
bowel movements, it is Walter Kennedy, who was a contemporary of many of the legal realists.
A professor of law at Fordham, he was described as “perhaps the most widely respected Catholic
legal scholar”7 in America of his generation, and a part of group of Catholic legal scholars who
during the 1930s and 1940s attacked the legal realists for what they perceived as dangerous
ideas.8 It was not uncommon for these critics to suggest that realist ideas were similar (and perhaps even led) to those of the European fascists. Kennedy was the most persistent of the group,
writing over ﬁfteen articles dedicating to realism bashing.9
For Kennedy, just as it was for Kozinski, the what-the-judge-had-for-breakfast trope served
as a reductio, proof of how ridiculous the legal realists were. He made repeated references to it,
mocking the realists for their suggestion that lawyers should become “stomach specialists,”10 that
they believed “gastronomical disturbances”11 affected the outcomes of cases, that they thought
4

See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 62 (2007).
5
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 129 n.15
(2009). A recent note on the European history of this idea similarly stated that it was “unclear whether any of
the American realists really claimed anything of that sort.” Giovanni Tuzet, A Short Note on Digestive Realism, 25
REVUS 11, 11 (2015).
6
For a recent example, showing the idea lives beyond academia, and that its association with legal realism
has crossed the Atlantic see David Pannick, Why No Offender Wants to Face a Judge Who Is Tired, Hungry or
Disappointed, TIMES (London), (Jan. 19, 2017), available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-no-offenderwants-to-face-a-judge-who-is-tired-hungry-or-disappointed-6bdxbm2w0.
7
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM
OF VALUE 165 (1973).
8
The most extensive discussion of the Catholic critique of legal realism is John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang,
The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1203 (2015).
They list fourteen Catholic scholars who wrote critically of legal realism. See id. at 1258 n.416.
9
See id. at 1230 n.200, for a list of seventeen essays containing a substantial critique of legal realism. Even
this list is incomplete as it does not include critical reviews, such as the one cited in note 13, infra.
10
Walter B. Kennedy, Another Job for Jurisprudence, 8 MOD. L. REV. 18, 21 (1945).
11
Walter B. Kennedy, Law Reviews as Usual, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 50, 55 (1943); Walter B. Kennedy, A
Review of Legal Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362, 366 (1940) (attributing to the legal realists “the gastronomical
approach which urges the advocate to take a sly glance at the judge’s breakfast menu”).
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lawyers should not bother with “dust-laden volumes” but investigate “how [the judge or legistor’s] digestive tract is functioning.”12 In one place he referred to it as the “so-called ‘wheatieexplanation’” of judicial opinions.13
But it is not just critics who attributed the idea to the legal realists and focused on it as a
kind of synecdoche for their entire oeuvre. In a speech delivered in 1941, Judge Charles Clark
told his audience that “the legal realists have acquired the name—or frame—of the ‘gastronomical school of jurisprudence,’ since they are supposed to attribute judicial opinion primarily to
what the judge had for breakfast.”14 Unlike Kennedy, Clark was sympathetic to the realist cause.
Before his appointment to the bench Clark had served as dean of Yale Law School where many
of the culprits were based, and he made it clear that thought they had an important message.15
II.
These early attributions only make the question of origins even more intriguing. Is this a myth
with no basis in reality? As far as I could ﬁnd, the ﬁrst appearance of something like this idea in
the work of an American academic is in a 1905 essay by Roscoe Pound. He wrote there that
judges should not be like “the oriental cadi administering justice at the city gate by the light of
nature tempered by the state of his digestion for the time being.”16
Whether Pound belongs in the ranks of the legal realists is a topic best left for another
place.17 Be that as it may, Pound used the idea, perhaps facetiously, as a contrast to his ideal of
principled adjudication, quite the opposite of the supposed realist view. And in any event, neither
Kennedy nor Clark mentioned Pound in their essays. Clark, in fact, did not cite anyone in relation
to this idea; but Kennedy did. His source was an article by Karl Llewellyn, entitled On Reading
and Using the Newer Jurisprudence.18 The essay was a critical survey of ideas that had been percolating in the legal academy in the previous decade. Its main goal was to show that the questions

12

Walter B. Kennedy, Men or Laws, 2 BROOK. L. REV. 11, 13 (1932).
Walter B. Kennedy, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 996 (1941) (reviewing EDWIN N. GARLAN,
LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE (1941)). So called by whom? I have not been able to ﬁnd any other reference to
this expression. Perhaps it was more widely used in law school corridors of the day, leaving this lone written
reference as the sole remaining remain ossiﬁed in print for the legal paleontologists to observe.
14
Charles E. Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Society, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 394 (1941).
15
See id. at 395.
16
Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 21 (1905). This passage is quoted in Jerome
Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effects on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human
Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 24 n.17 (1931). Frank, however, criticized Pound for his legal orientalism. See id. at
24–25.
17
On the realists’ complicated relationship with Pound (and vice versa) see N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND
AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
18
The article was published in two parts in 26 A.B.A. J. 300, 418 (1940) and in one part in 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 581 (1940). All further citations are to the Columbia Law Review version.
13
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and problems “jurisprudes” were discussing at the time were relevant and useful even for the most
practically-oriented lawyers. Llewellyn, at the time professor at Columbia, must have thought the
message important enough that he arranged for the essay to be simultaneously published both
in his home law review and in the American Bar Association’s ﬂagship journal.
Llewellyn’s essay covers a lot of ground, with about two pages of it dedicated to “the Jurisprudence of advocacy.”19 It was important, Llewellyn said, for lawyers to consider judges’ personalities as those may affect the outcome of cases. Such a study, he said, should “not ignore the
facts of life,” which include the possibility that “[i]n the case of a particular judge subject to
dyspepsia, the unfortunate effects of a particular ill-advised breakfast do alter the advocate’s
practical problem.”20 Such happenstances, as well as ailments of a more permanent nature, he
said, are plainly relevant for advocates, and indeed are probably recognized by all of them. He
therefore “confess[ed] to total inability to understand why” discussing such matters should be
considered “unilluminating or indecent.”21 Nevertheless, Llewellyn qualiﬁed these remarks by
saying that he never studied any “judge’s breakfast, or headache,” and he did not think either “a
peculiarly fruitful line of study.”22
Though Llewellyn made no reference to any previous scholarship, the apologetic tone of his
remarks on the subject suggests that he was responding here to already-existing associations
between legal realism and judicial breakfasts. Kennedy had already taken a bite at the realists on
these grounds in 1932, almost a decade before the publication of Llewellyn’s essay. And Clark’s
remarks, published only a year after Llewellyn’s essay, suggest the link was considered in academic circles as matter of common knowledge.
And indeed there is an earlier, and much clearer, discussion of this relationship in an earlier,
well-known realist tract. Jerome Frank’s blockbuster Law and the Modern Mind was published in
1930 and immediately caused a stir. Here was a book written by a practitioner who did away
with all the pieties of his profession and presented to the world a thoroughly unvarnished account of the law. To this day the book enjoys a rather notorious reputation, not entirely deserved.
Though not without its faults (which Frank later acknowledged), the book is reformist and humanist in spirit, not cynical or nihilist.23
One of the many topics the book addresses is the view that legal outcomes are primarily
governed by legal rules. Frank did not deny the existence and signiﬁcance of legal rules to adjudication, but he insisted that they were only part of the story. An important part according to
Frank was the personality of the judge. One piece of evidence he relied on was an obscure 1869

19

Id. at 594.
Id. at 592.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 593.
23
See Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127 (2010).
20
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decision by the Alabama Supreme Court. He quoted approvingly (and italicized for extra effect)
the court’s proclamation that
it cannot safely be denied that mere judicial discretion is sometimes very much interfered with by
prejudge, which may be swayed and controlled by the merest triﬂes such as the toothache, the rheumatism, the gout, or a ﬁt of indigestion, or even through the very means by which indigestion is
frequently sought to be avoided.24

This then is the smoking gun. Legal realism’s single most famous book suggests a clear link
between the state’s of judge’s mind and the state of his digestion. It is not entirely clear why
Kennedy chose to cite Llewellyn and not Frank, even though Frank’s endorsement of the idea
was far more forthright. He deﬁnitely knew Law and the Modern Mind and though not a fan, he
acknowledged its “lively and attractive style.”25 It is likely that the fact Frank quoted a case in
support of his contention made him a less congenial target. Coming from what even then was
an old judicial decision from a state Supreme Court gave the idea the kind of respectability, even
authority, that the ramblings of an out-of-touch Ivy League academic could never have.
The decision in this case involved a petition by one John W. Chase, a white man accused of
murdering a black man, to have his trial removed from Montgomery County. Chase alleged that
due to a concerted effort to vilify him, public opinion in Montgomery and neighboring counties,
where black population was substantial, was set against him and for this reason he would not get
a fair trial. The speciﬁc question the court had to address was the scope of discretion available
to the trial court in deciding whether to remove the case. The statute in question said that a
defendant “may have his trial removed to another county,” and the prosecution argued that this
meant the trial court had a wide discretion whether to allow or refuse the motion, which should
not be interfered with.
The author of the decision was Justice Thomas Minott Peters (1810–1888), who would later
serve brieﬂy as Chief Justice of Alabama. He was a man of considerable abilities and achievements, who “distinguished himself as a lawyer, a judge, a state assemblyman, a teacher, a schoolmaster, a newspaper editor, and as a scientist with a national reputation who was elected to the
American Scientiﬁc Association.”26 A committed Unionist, Peters argued after the Civil War for

24

Ex p. Chase, 43 Ala. 303, 310–11 (1869), quoted in JEROME FRANK, LAW AND MODERN MIND 137 (1930).
Frank did not forget this case and quoted from it again in JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 414 (1949) [hereinafter FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL].
25
Walter B. Kennedy, The Cult of the Robe: A Dissent, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 192, 192 (1945).
26
Paul Horton, Lightning Rod Scalawag: The Unlikely Political Career of Thomas Minott Peters, 64 ALA. REV. 116,
119 (2011). Horton’s essay is a valuable, sympathetic portrait of Peters’s life and accomplishments.
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the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a challenge to Black Codes, and even successfully defended an interracial marriage from a legal challenge.27 After he was elected to the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Peters issued a series of decisions that affirmed his opposition to
the secession and his commitment to the civil rights of newly enfranchised former slaves.28
Justice Peters’s Chase decision consisted of two steps. He ﬁrst explained that the right to a
trial heard by a “fair and impartial jury” was a fundamental right that could never be infringed.
The strength of this right, he argued, affected the scope of the discretion. Peters then argued
that the word “may” in the relevant statute should be effectively be read as “must,” assuming the
facts regarding the impediments to a fair trial are shown to be true.
As something of a rhetorical ﬂourish Justice Peters then considered the dangers of wide
discretion. The full passage from which some words have already been quoted reads as follows:
The writer of this opinion has known a popular judicial officer grow quite angry with a suitor in his
court, and threaten him with imprisonment, for no ostensible reason, save the fact, that he wore an
overcoat made of wolf skins! Moreover, it can not safely be denied, that mere judicial discretion is
sometimes very much interfered with by prejudice, which may be swayed and controlled by the
merest triﬂes—such as the tooth ache, the rheumatism, the gout, or a ﬁt of indigestion, or even
through the very means by which indigestion is frequently sought to be avoided.29

He then added:
Whatever may have been the construction of this important statute heretofore, it is now evidently
unwise longer to keep so indispensible [sic] a right as that of “a fair and impartial trial,[”] in a criminal
case, under the uncertain security of a power, so uncontrollable and liable to error as mere judicial
discretion—a power that may possibly be misdirected by a ﬁt of temporary sickness, an extra mint
julep, or the smell or looks of a peculiar overcoat, or things more trivial than these, which may imperil
the due course of justice in the administration of the law. Triﬂes, however ridiculous, cease to be
triﬂes when they may interfere with a safe administration of the law.30

Discretion, then, was dangerous, especially when acknowledging the un- or semi-conscious ways
in our prejudices may affect our decisions.
Frank did not follow this reasoning all the way through. He thought the discretionary element in adjudication is ineliminable and therefore better openly disclosed and discussed than
concealed. But it is nevertheless obvious why he picked this case: Frank had a life-long obsession
with trials. He thought they were far more important than appellate decisions and that the outcomes of decisions there, because they largely turned on questions of fact, were far less predictable. In his mind, other legal scholars (including most other legal realists) suffered from a malady

27
28

See id. at 129.
See id. at 133–35. All this apparently made Peters “one of the most hated jurists in Alabama history.” Id.

at 116.
29
30

Chase, 43 Ala. at 310–11.
Id. at 311.
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he called “appellate-court-itis,” the excessive focus on appellate courts.31 This interest in the trial
may explain his willingness to discuss the gastronomical idea more openly than anyone else.
Appellate decisions are less often decided on the spot and are typically decided by a multimember panel. These factors reduce the odds that the ﬂeeting discomforts that afflict all of us on
occasion will affect the outcome of a given case. The lightning-speed, reasons-free decisions that
are part of every trial are much more prone to such inﬂuences.32
Though Frank is sometimes said to have mellowed in his later years, especially after his
appointment to the Second Circuit, his 1949 book, Courts on Trial, retains much of its predecessor’s vigor. Frank returned there to the topic of the hidden inﬂuences on judicial decision-making
and asserted that though “no one, except jocularly, has ever proposed explaining all or most
decisions in terms of the judges’ digestive disturbances,”33 such effects could not be ignored. “Out
of my experience as a trial lawyer,” he wrote, “I can testify that a trial judge, because of overeating
at lunch, may be so somnolent in the afternoon court-session that he fails to hear an important
item of testimony and so disregards it when deciding the case.”34 To reassure his readers that
these were not just the cynical remarks of a famously contrarian lawyer but a long-acknowledged
phenomenon, Frank added illustrative quotations from Alexander Pope, Charles Dickens, Lord
Campbell, and Michel de Montaigne. That these remarks came mostly from non-lawyers more
than suggests that this was not some novel revelation, but something that others have long
acknowledged, and that lawyers, perhaps out of their protectiveness to the image of their profession, were keen to hide.
III.
The truth, then, lies somewhere between the realists’ defenders and their detractors. The idea
that what the judge had for breakfast apparently has quite an old provenance. It was familiar
enough that one ﬁnds casual references to it in newspapers predating the realists. For example,
in 1899 a Minnesota newspaper reported on a lecture by the Minnesota pastor Samuel G. Smith
in which he reportedly declared that “the administration of justice in the police courts depends
largely upon the digestion of the judges.”35 A decade later, a letter to the editor to the Sunday
Oregonian stated that “[t]he same Judge might, in accordance with the condition of his digestion

31

Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 9, 23 (1949). In this essay (published
also as the preface for the 1949 edition of Law and the Modern Mind), Frank targeted only Benjamin Cardozo.
Elsewhere Frank led a more general charge against what he called “the upper court myth, the myth that upper
courts are the heart of court-house government.” FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 24, at 222–24.
32
At times, however, Frank was unwilling to grant even that. See Frank, supra note 16, at 29.
33
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 24, at 162.
34
Id.
35
Slums in Life of Cities, ST. PAUL GLOBE (Nov. 18, 1899) at 8, 8.
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at the time, rule favorably today and unfavorably tomorrow.”36 It was a kind of received wisdom
among cynical (or perhaps, realistic) observers of the judicial system that personal and psychological factors affected adjudication. And this idea was at times summarized in terms of “what
the judge had for breakfast.” The authors of an early study on individual differences among
judges reported that when they had considered embarking on the study, a colleague tried to
dissuade them from pursuing it “since everyone knew that what the judge had for breakfast
frequently determined the length or kind of sentence he gave.”37
Perhaps the most prominent person to voice this idea was Charlton T. Lewis (1834–1904).
Lewis had a wide-ranging career as a scholar and a lawyer. He wrote a history of Germany,
compiled a Latin dictionary, and in the course of his life lectured on a wide range of topics,
including math, Greek, and insurance. In addition, he served as counsel for the Mutual Insurance
Company, and for a short time was even the managing editor of the New York Evening Post.38
Another issue that preoccupied Lewis was prison reform, and late in his life served as president
of the New York State Prison Association. In this capacity he gave a lecture entitled “The Principles Underlying the Problems of Crime,” which according to a contemporaneous report criticized the wide divergence in punishment in different states, as well as within a single state: “You
have but to look at the sentences inﬂicted by the different judges of this city for similar offences
[sic] to see how far [the] administration [of justice] in one State attains its ends. The term of
imprisonment which is ﬁxed for a particular convict depends far more upon the temper and
digestion of the judge than upon considerations of vital justice.”39
As we have seen, some of the realists were not averse to the idea and made references to it,
explicitly and in print. But there is a further twist to the story, for the attitude toward the judge’s
indigestion reveals something about an important divide among the legal realists. Elsewhere, I
argue that what we now call “legal realism” consisted of two very distinct groups of scholars,
36

W.V. Lance, letter to the editor, Dilatory Moves in Law: Some Judges’ Decision Shown to Be Matters of Digestion,
SUNDAY OREGONIAN (Portland), (Mar. 7, 1909) at 10, 10. Some years later the same newspaper summarized an
early empirical study on sentencing, and concluded that “the length of sentences imposed by the same judge
over a period of time varied for the same offense, depending, perhaps, upon the judge’s digestion and the state
of public opinion, but the variance was still greater as between jurists.” MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland), (Oct.
21, 1932) at 8, 8.
37
Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 812 (1933). The conclusion of this early study were that sentencing outcomes are actually
“fairly well determined” by factors to which the judge was exposed before becoming a judge. Id. at 814.
38
See Charlton T. Lewis Dead, SUN (New York) (May 27, 1904) at 3; C.T. Lewis Dead, N.Y. TRIBUNE (May 27,
1904) at 9; Charlton Thomas Lewis, in OBITUARY RECORD OF GRADUATES OF YALE UNIVERSITY (5th ser.) 324
(1904), http://mssa.library.yale.edu/obituary_record/1859_1924/1903-04.pdf.
39
See Justice to Criminals, N.Y. TRIBUNE (July 19, 1902) at 5, 5. Cf. Charlton T. Lewis, Annual Report of the
Executive Committee, in FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK. FOR THE YEAR
1903, at 11, 12 (1904) (criticizing the “inequality of sentences arising from differences in the views and disposition
of judges”).
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who on a series of issues held very different views. One realist group was realistic in the sense
that it wanted to make the university study of law more oriented toward legal practice. It saw
the real danger in excessively theoretical study of law, one that did not reﬂect law as it was found
in the real world. The other realist strand wanted to push the academic study of law in the
opposite direction, away from legal practice and in the direction of the natural sciences. These
legal realists, of whom Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Hessel Yntema were the most
notable, were realistic in the sense that it considered the study of law continuous with scientiﬁc
realism.40 Llewellyn and Frank were the most notable members of the ﬁrst group, and as such
were willing to say that these psychological factors were part of the law, or (if it’s any different)
part of legal practice.41 On the other hand, perhaps because of their resistance to the application
of scientiﬁc method to the law, they did not seek to examine the matter empirically.
This difference in orientation also manifested itself in the attitude toward uncertainty. Because the practice-oriented realists looked at law from the perspective of the practitioner, they
considered the subjective, human element in the law as ineliminable. Instead of ignoring it, or
hopelessly trying to eradicate it, they thought lawyers should acknowledge it and to some extent
even embrace it as a source of law’s vitality.42 The idea that judicial decisions were on occasion
inﬂuenced by the judge’s state of digestion ﬁt right into this view, and from that perspective
perhaps not necessarily an unmitigated evil. It was a vivid indication that law was a human affair.
The other realists, on the other hand, were realistic in seeking to base law on realities as discovered by empirical science. Many of them were attracted to science in part because it held the
promise of minimizing the uncertainties that pervaded the law, including those caused by the
foibles of human nature. Cohen thus criticized “certain advocates of realistic jurisprudence” for
their “willing[ness] to look upon decisions as simple unanalyzable products of judicial hunches
or indigestion.” “Law,” he countered, “is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product of judicial bellyaches.” With the right scientiﬁc methods one can discover that law was grounded in
“predictable, social determinants that govern the course of judicial decision.”43 Despite this difference, it should be emphasized that even among the practice-oriented realists no-one has ever
40

See Dan Priel, The Return of Legal Realism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
(Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., forthcoming 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989165; Dan Priel, Legal Realisms (unpublished manuscript).
41
See Frank, supra note 16, at 31–39; Karl N. Llewellyn, How Appellate Courts Decide Cases (pt. 1), 16 PA. B.
ASS’N Q. 220, 227 (1945).
42
See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 24, at 98; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules of or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397 (1950). Acknowledgement of
this aspect should not be mistaken for the view that judges were free to decide cases any way they wanted.
Contrary to prevailing views on the realists, they believed legal doctrine was usually fairly determinate and
capable of constraining judges. See Priel, Legal Realisms, supra note 40.
43
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935).
The underlying idea is that one could turn to social science to discover a predictable pattern of behavior. Such
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suggested that adjudication is primarily determined by judges’ passing ailments. And none of the
realists, of whatever stripe, ever put the question to any kind of empirical examination.
And so the matter remained for a many years. A recent paper that generated considerable
media attention picked up on where the realists left off. The study examined the decisions of an
Israeli parole board and found that prisoners whose case was heard early in the morning were
more likely to have their petition granted than those whose cases were heard just before lunch.
The board became sympathetic again after the lunch break with rates of release declining again
afterwards.44 The authors of the study considered hunger and tiredness as the most likely explanation for this result. Others, however, questioned that conclusion, suggesting alternative explanations having to do with the impact of legal representation or the possibility that the cases were
not heard in random order.45
A controlled experimental setting, despite its limitations, might shed some further light on
the question. Existing studies already show that hunger and other kinds of physical discomfort
have various impacts on cognitive abilities and decision-making,46 but as the question here may
have to do more with empathy than with cognitive abilities, their relevance to the question at
hand is unclear. To test it subjects would be given the task of adjudicating an identical sequence
of cases over several hours. The cases would either be based exclusively on written materials or
on videotaped “trial(s)” that will ensure that all subjects are given identical evidence, presented
in exactly the same way. Subjects will have to decide whether to convict the defendants, and if
they convict, to decide on the appropriate punishment. Some of the subjects will be given access
to food throughout the process while others kept hungry. For extra ﬂavor, one could further
examine whether different kinds of food (sweet versus salty, spicy versus mild) have any effect
on decision-making.
Until such a study is undertaken it looks like we remain where Llewellyn was when writing
in 1940—with a plausible hypothesis, but no decisive answer. As for historians, they may have
another question in store. The April and May 1914 issues of several Christian magazines carried
a short advertisement that looks at ﬁrst like a genuine news report (see Figure 1). This early

information could be used to improve society by employing the same scientiﬁc methods. Interestingly, like the
later scientiﬁc legal realists, Charlton Lewis was committed to the application of scientiﬁc method to legal
reform on the basis of welfarist principles. See The Reform of Penal Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 1903) at 5.
44
See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011).
45
See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E833 (2011); but see Shai Danziger et al., Reply to Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous
Factors in Judicial Decisions Persist, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E834 (2011).
46
See ROY Y. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE GREATEST HUMAN
STRENGTH 22–23, 225–26 (2011) (hunger diminishes willpower); SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR,
SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 5–8 (2013) (extreme hunger affecting interests and cognitive abilities).
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example of native advertising tells of an unnamed member of New York’s state Prison Commission who is “reported to have said” in a public address that “[t]he whole system of sentencing is
absurd. The length of a man’s sentence sometimes depends upon the judge’s digestion.”47 The
copywriter did not ﬁnd this suggestion too alarming. After all, “[j]udges are only human beings,”
and there is no doubt that a “disordered or impaired digestion” will get in the way of “thinking
clearly, fairly, judiciously.”48 But the ad went on to suggest a more intriguing link between indigestion and crime: “it is a fact that a well-balanced ration, such as shredded wheat biscuit, with
fresh fruits, develops an evenness of disposition and a vigor an equilibrium in the bodily functions.” (Could this have been the unlikely source for Walter Kennedy’s “wheatie-explanation”?)
The wrong kind of food, one with “an excess of proteid,” can lead to “the accumulation of toxins
in the body.” Persist with such a diet, and the body will eventually not be able to rid itself of this
“poison.” The ad remains non-committed on the question whether the “more heinous crimes can
be traced to indigestion,”49 but students of gastro-juridical history may well want to examine
whether it was at this moment that the Twinkie defense was born.

47

Judges and Digestion, 89 CHRISTIAN ADV. 551, 551 (1914); 109 CHURCHMAN 517, 517 (1914); 99 CONGRE538, 538 (1914); 45 CONTINENT 521, 521 (1914); 20 ASSEMBLY HERALD 285,
285 (1914). Thanks to Simon Stern who found and sent me the relevant news report, it is a good estimate that
the person in question is Charlton Lewis, discussed in text accompanying notes 38–39, supra. According to the
ad the address was recent and took place in Buffalo. Lewis’s address was over ten years old at the time, and it
was delivered in New York. Other than that, however, the details match.
48
Judges and Digestion, 89 CHRISTIAN ADV. 551, 551 (1914).
49
Id.
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Figure 1: One version of the ad mentioned in the text (this one from The Christian Advocate)
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